Tag Archives: teaching

abolishing schools of education, or MacIntyre on the non-practice of education

Recently, some­one brought to my atten­tion this arti­cle on abol­ish­ing schools of edu­ca­tion. The Cen­ter for Col­lege Afford­abil­ity and Pro­duc­tiv­ity argues that we should doubt the value of schools of edu­ca­tion: hold­ers of degrees in edu­ca­tion do not seem to be any more effec­tive at teach­ing than non-education majors, because the schools some­times try to

plagiarism, ignorance and responsibility

Here’s the third post in a series on cheating/academic dis­hon­esty in col­lege (first post, sec­ond post). A year and a half ago, I taught an intro­duc­tion to phi­los­o­phy course inde­pen­dently. The lec­tures were in per­son, but the tests were online because the class only met once per week and I didn’t want to use up

the wrongness of cheating

Last time, I dis­cussed some prob­lems with the the­ory that, when you cheat, “you’re only cheat­ing your­self.” Today, I have a few things to say on the wrong­ness of cheat­ing. These are by no means com­pre­hen­sive or ground break­ing, just some food for thought. First, I’ll back­track just a lit­tle and say that there is

"you're only cheating yourself"

As a grad­u­ate teach­ing assis­tant and course instruc­tor, I’ve encoun­tered cheat­ing and pla­gia­rism a num­ber of times. I know that many of my friends encounter sim­i­lar issues as well. So, to mark the end of this semes­ter, I thought I’d start a mini-series of posts on the sub­ject. First up: the “you’re only cheat­ing your­self”

selling philosophy as quasi-science: a parable

I came across an inter­est­ing post by Adam over at Sophist­pun­dit called Being a Scholar When You Can’t be a Sci­en­tist. The author argues that, although dis­ci­plines like his­tory and phi­los­o­phy are not sci­ences, there exist rel­e­vant virtues to be hon­ored in their prac­tice: humil­ity, trans­parency of method, engag­ing exten­sive sources, and clar­ity of pre­sen­ta­tion.

teaching philosophy: possibility vs. plausibility

Here’s some­thing with which I’ve noticed intro to phi­los­o­phy stu­dents tend to strug­gle: the dif­fer­ence between it being pos­si­ble that a the­ory is true, and the theory’s being plau­si­ble. Exam­ple: In the course I’m TAing this semes­ter, one of the top­ics we dis­cussed is the nature of value. In virtue of what does any­thing have