Tag Archives: situationism

states of character vs. virtues

Ok, one last bit for now on the sit­u­a­tion­ism stuff (con­tin­ued from here, here, and here). I think a main source of con­fu­sion is the dis­tinc­tion between what empir­i­cal claims virtue ethi­cists make, imply, or are com­mit­ted to, and what their nor­ma­tive claims are. Here’s my inter­pre­ta­tion of at least part of the story: Empir­i­cal Claim:

another stab at situationism

I think maybe I explained sit­u­a­tion­ism rather poorly back here in skep­ti­cism about moral char­ac­ter. Some things Adam says over at Sophist­pun­dit about The Nature of Char­ac­ter pro­vide a good oppor­tu­nity for me to clear things up for him as well as any­one else I may have unwit­tingly con­fused. So let me address a few