Tag Archives: ethics

being judgmental: imprudent and vicious

Peo­ple seem to like to claim that they aren’t judg­men­tal. Espe­cially the hip, young, urban, lib­eral peo­ple who I encounter reg­u­larly. What’s wrong with being judg­men­tal, any­way? There are at least two aspects to it, I think which maybe get con­flated. On the one hand, some­times the bad­ness of being judg­men­tal gets explained some­thing like

on taking oneself too seriously

I have recently noticed that it has some­how become some­what fash­ion­able to voice one’s dis­ap­proval of peo­ple who “take them­selves too seri­ously.” For exam­ple, some­one might say about her­self, “I work hard, but I play hard, and I try not to take myself too seri­ously,” thereby insin­u­at­ing that some­thing is wrong with tak­ing one­self very

plagiarism, etiquette, and morality

Pla­gia­rism by col­lege stu­dents has got­ten some atten­tion in the New York Times lately, and it occurs to me that I have dropped the ball on a series of posts about pla­gia­rism that I started ear­lier this sum­mer. Although I had planned to write other stuff next, I’m instead going to allow myself to be

my immortality poll & paper

I tweeted this recently: Phi­los­o­phy poll: T/F — Death is a nec­es­sary con­di­tion for the mean­ing­ful­ness of life; immor­tal­ity is incom­pat­i­ble with mean­ing­ful­ness. Here are the totally unrep­re­sen­ta­tive results: False — 6 True — 3 (assum­ing that this response counts as a “true”) For what­ever it’s worth, my vote is “false.” Assum­ing that the mean­ing­ful­ness of one’s life

states of character vs. virtues

Ok, one last bit for now on the sit­u­a­tion­ism stuff (con­tin­ued from here, here, and here). I think a main source of con­fu­sion is the dis­tinc­tion between what empir­i­cal claims virtue ethi­cists make, imply, or are com­mit­ted to, and what their nor­ma­tive claims are. Here’s my inter­pre­ta­tion of at least part of the story: Empir­i­cal Claim:

another stab at situationism

I think maybe I explained sit­u­a­tion­ism rather poorly back here in skep­ti­cism about moral char­ac­ter. Some things Adam says over at Sophist­pun­dit about The Nature of Char­ac­ter pro­vide a good oppor­tu­nity for me to clear things up for him as well as any­one else I may have unwit­tingly con­fused. So let me address a few

snapshots of moral character

Here is my very late reply to Jim on skep­ti­cism about moral char­ac­ter. The short answer: No, in all my mod­er­ately exten­sive read­ing on this sub­ject, I have not found any “stud­ies that actu­ally involve the obser­va­tion of a person’s behav­ior across a wide range of rel­e­vant cir­cum­stances,” as opposed to stud­ies which deal with

so be good for goodness sake

I’m tak­ing a break from seri­ous con­tent to bring you friv­o­lous xmas post, 2009. You know that song “Santa Clause is Com­ing to Town?” It con­tains the lyric: “so be good for good­ness sake.” But this is clearly incon­sis­tent with the con­tent of the song, and it dri­ves me crazy. Being good for good­ness’ sake means that

skepticism about moral character

The other day, my buddy Adam over at Sophist­pun­dit wrote about Char­ac­ter. I was not sur­prised that, being an econ­o­mist and some kind of Humean virtue ethi­cist, he thinks that moral­ity mostly con­cerns what kind of peo­ple we are, and that actions are sig­nals to other peo­ple, pro­vid­ing infor­ma­tion about what we’re like. Adam claims that

wasting food

Even though I try really hard to buy only the gro­ceries we need and in amounts we can use, my hus­band & I still end up throw­ing away a pretty good bit of food on a reg­u­lar basis. What I can’t fig­ure out is why throw­ing away food feels so much worse than let­ting clothes