selling philosophy as quasi-science: a parable
November 21, 2009
I came across an interesting post by Adam over at Sophistpundit called Being a Scholar When You Can’t be a Scientist. The author argues that, although disciplines like history and philosophy are not sciences, there exist relevant virtues to be honored in their practice: humility, transparency of method, engaging extensive sources, and clarity of presentation.
I basically agree with all of this. But I have kind of a pragmatic objection to biting the philosophy-isn’t-science bullet all the way, at least in my capacity as a philosophy teaching assistant. Allow me to illustrate this reservation with a virtual skit.
Scene: Philosophy Teaching Assistants’ office. Late afternoon. A young woman, casually dressed, spins in a chair in her cubicle, fiddling with an iPhone.
Enter, stage left. An even younger women, carrying a large backpack, approaches the cubicle and tentatively takes a seat.
TA: Hi, are you here for office hours? What can I help you with?
Student: Well, I studied really hard for the last test, but I only got a B. I thought I knew all the right answers but apparently they just aren’t good enough!
TA: (looking at blue book) Well, on this first question here, you were supposed to show that you know that some things just might be valuable intrinsically, apart from anyone’s beliefs or choices. Do you remember when we discussed that in class?
Student: Um, kind of, I don’t know. I try to take good notes to memorize later but (bracing self) it’s just all so SUBJECTIVE. I’m an engineering major, and in science there are facts. In philosophy, it’s like everyone is just MAKING STUFF UP.
TA: (getting excited) Oh no, it’s not like that at all! So you know how scientific experiments work, right? You come up with a hypothesis and then test it?
Student: (meekly) Yes…
TA: (getting a little too excited) Well it’s actually alot like that in philosophy! We started with a theory – or hypothesis – about the origin of moral value. We decided to test whether all value is necessarily subjective. But then, we did an experiment of sorts! A thought experiment! And we found evidence that subjectivism might not be true! Because we had intuitions that it’s good that a beautiful planet exists, even if no one knows about it!!!!!
Student: Oh, I see now! Philosophers disagree on matters, and they have methods for testing which theories fit the relevant data better!
TA: Hallelujah!
Student: It all makes sense! I love philosophy now! (kissing TA’s feet)
All characters appearing in this work are fictitious. Any resemblance to real persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental.
teaching philosophy: possibility vs. plausibility
November 19, 2009
Here’s something with which I’ve noticed intro to philosophy students tend to struggle: the difference between it being possible that a theory is true, and the theory’s being plausible. Example:
In the course I’m TAing this semester, one of the topics we discussed is the nature of value. In virtue of what does anything have value, or what is the source or cause of things being valuable? Most of the students have never taken philosophy before, and it seems that many are pre-theoretical subjectivists about value. Very roughly, subjectivism is the view that things get their value from people valuing them. The main alternative to subjectivism is objectivism about value. Objectivism, again roughly, is the view that all or some things just are valuable, independent of anyone’s beliefs, attitudes, choices, etc.
So, in the class, we do this thought experiment where the professor taps students’ intuitions by asking them about the status of a beautiful planet containing a well-functioning ecosystem. By stipulation, no one knows that this planet exists. Is it better that the planet exists than if it didn’t exist? If you had the power and choice to bring such a planet into existence at no cost to yourself and then would forget about it forever, do you have any reason to choose to create the planet?
You’re supposed to get the intuition that you should create the planet. The bigger conclusion to draw is that it’s at least possible that the planet, and maybe other things, could just be valuable, period, regardless of whether anyone cares or even knows about them. Whether subjectivism or objectivism about value is the better theory, all things considered, is a separate question.
But, when asked: “Is it possible that something could be valuable even if no one values it?,” quite a few students, presupposing subjectivism, say no – it is only possible for things to get value from people valuing them. This is false. What they mean is that it is only plausible to think that things get value from people valuing them.
To correct this, you have to teach the student what “possible” means, philosophically speaking. And before you know it, you’re talking about alternate possible worlds, and the laws of physics, and mathematical truths, and it all goes downhill from there. While I always do my best to help students in this sort of case, I can’t help but conclude that the way critical thinking is handled by conventional educational institutions is just far too little, far too late.
