Category Archives: virtue ethics

Seligman on happiness: authentic or by definition?

I’m almost done with Mar­tin Seligman’s well-known book of pos­i­tive psy­chol­ogy, Authen­tic Hap­pi­ness (2003). It’s been a very good read — although I was famil­iar with many of the rel­e­vant research find­ings, from my var­i­ous inter­net trav­els (and Bark­ing Up The Wrong Tree in par­tic­u­lar), Selig­man puts it all together and lays it out in

poverty, willpower, and virtue ethics

Recently, philoso­pher Michael Cholbi tweeted this story: “Why Can’ More Poor Peo­ple Escape Poverty?”, along with the sug­ges­tion that the find­ings described therein could have impli­ca­tions for virtue the­ory. To make a long story short: “In the 1990s, social psy­chol­o­gists devel­oped a the­ory of “depletable” self-control. The idea was that an individual’s capac­ity for exert­ing willpower was

on taking oneself too seriously

I have recently noticed that it has some­how become some­what fash­ion­able to voice one’s dis­ap­proval of peo­ple who “take them­selves too seri­ously.” For exam­ple, some­one might say about her­self, “I work hard, but I play hard, and I try not to take myself too seri­ously,” thereby insin­u­at­ing that some­thing is wrong with tak­ing one­self very

states of character vs. virtues

Ok, one last bit for now on the sit­u­a­tion­ism stuff (con­tin­ued from here, here, and here). I think a main source of con­fu­sion is the dis­tinc­tion between what empir­i­cal claims virtue ethi­cists make, imply, or are com­mit­ted to, and what their nor­ma­tive claims are. Here’s my inter­pre­ta­tion of at least part of the story: Empir­i­cal Claim:

another stab at situationism

I think maybe I explained sit­u­a­tion­ism rather poorly back here in skep­ti­cism about moral char­ac­ter. Some things Adam says over at Sophist­pun­dit about The Nature of Char­ac­ter pro­vide a good oppor­tu­nity for me to clear things up for him as well as any­one else I may have unwit­tingly con­fused. So let me address a few

snapshots of moral character

Here is my very late reply to Jim on skep­ti­cism about moral char­ac­ter. The short answer: No, in all my mod­er­ately exten­sive read­ing on this sub­ject, I have not found any “stud­ies that actu­ally involve the obser­va­tion of a person’s behav­ior across a wide range of rel­e­vant cir­cum­stances,” as opposed to stud­ies which deal with

skepticism about moral character

The other day, my buddy Adam over at Sophist­pun­dit wrote about Char­ac­ter. I was not sur­prised that, being an econ­o­mist and some kind of Humean virtue ethi­cist, he thinks that moral­ity mostly con­cerns what kind of peo­ple we are, and that actions are sig­nals to other peo­ple, pro­vid­ing infor­ma­tion about what we’re like. Adam claims that

more thoughts on veganism and well-being

I was thrilled to receive this thought­ful com­ment on my last post on my vegan exper­i­ment: Com­ment from abeala I have some dis­jointed things to say in response. First of all, yes, it can def­i­nitely be dif­fi­cult to have a sig­nif­i­cant other who does not eat the same way as you. Around the time I

how not to think about cutting in line: a crash course in normative ethics

While I was at the IHS sem­i­nar last week, some­one men­tioned in pass­ing the issue of whether or not it is morally per­mis­si­ble to allow peo­ple to go ahead of you in a line. What pre­cip­i­tated this ques­tion was the fact that we were using the same din­ing hall as a num­ber of groups of